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Abstract: 
 
Gambling, both in the casino-style and lottery forms, has risen to become a major component of 
the entertainment industry in the United States. State governments are the gatekeepers of this 
growing industry, holding the power to legalize and regulate all aspects of gambling. This thesis 
explores the rationale state governments have for legalizing gambling as well as the impact 
gambling tax revenues have for state budgets. The main focus is casino-style gambling, as 
casino-style gambling in particular is being pursued for expansion by numerous states in a 
variety of forms. As various forms of gambling are legalized throughout the country, a state’s 
gambling interests begin to face competition from both neighboring states and other forms of 
gambling within the state. Econometric models attempted to predict the tax revenues a state can 
obtain from legalized gambling based on such competition and a states own demographics. The 
results support a first-mover advantage for states expanding casino-style gambling and finds that 
new forms of gambling significantly erode established gambling industries. 
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Introduction:  
In the last fifteen years there has been a monumental shift in the gambling industry. Once 
dominated by state lotteries, with commercial casinos restricted to Nevada and Atlantic City, 
casino gambling is now growing substantially throughout the country. As lotteries began to 
experience declining rates of revenue growth, states turned towards other forms of gambling, 
namely casino-style, to gain much needed tax revenues (NGISC, 1999). The politics of 
legalization has led to a variety of forms of gambling expansion.  
 Similar to the experiences of the alcohol and tobacco industries, the supply of gambling 
is controlled and regulated by each individual state government in the U.S. As the gatekeepers of 
the gambling industry, state governments determine the forms and amount of gambling that will 
be legal in their respective states. While politics are a significant consideration, demographics, 
geography, and competition are key determinants of whether or not a particular form of 
gambling will be successful in a given state.  
Question Statement:   
The primary question of this thesis is: What amount of tax revenues can each State 
Government expect to gain from expanding gambling? It will predict the gambling tax revenues 
a state is capable of earning given the various forms of gambling explained later. In particular, it 
will include an analysis based on an econometric model that will focus on the rationale for each 
form of gambling available to states and the reasons each state has chosen or might choose one 
particular form of gambling over another.  
Why this topic is of interest:  
 The question of what is possible for state governments in the realm of gambling has been 
made interesting by several new developments over the last decade. As casino-style gambling 
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has expanded, the industry has become dominated by corporations that have promoted and 
popularized gambling. The emergence of poker tournaments on cable television with events such 
as the World Series of Poker on ESPN has boosted the awareness and acceptance of the gaming 
industry. The popularity of such shows and events makes the topic and analysis of gambling 
expansion very interesting. Harrah’s Entertainment studies have shown that greater than fifty 
percent of Americans find gambling personally acceptable while less than twenty percent of 
people find it not acceptable at all (Harrah’s, 1999). The majority of Americans want to know 
when and where gambling will turn up next.  
Why this topic is important: 
It is dually important to understand why state governments are pursuing this controversial 
industry.  In addition to the quantitative analysis that will project gambling tax revenues, an 
examination of the motivation that state governments have for expanding and regulating the 
gambling industry is necessary. The simple answer to this inquiry is tax revenues that states need 
for their ballooning state budgets. A more complicated analysis would show at first glance that 
states began the legalization of gambling not only to increase state tax revenues without the 
political backlash of raising sales or income taxes, but to also spur economic development in 
regions of the state experiencing economic hardship (Furlong, 1998).  
Economic development was the basis used to garner government support when gambling 
was legalized in Atlantic City, New Jersey (Madhusudhan, 1996). The expansion of casino 
gambling that began in the early 1990’s along the Mississippi river in the form of riverboats also 
targeted economically depressed areas. Now, as casino-style gambling has been legalized for 
many years, states are coming to rely more heavily on gambling tax revenues than ever before 
 5
(Table 1.1). They are beginning to expand gambling and loosen regulations on it solely to protect 
these tax revenues on which they have become reliant.  
States relying on Gambling Tax Dollars: 
In 2004, gambling tax revenues accounted for over 5% of total tax revenues in seventeen 
states. While it might not surprise anyone to learn that Nevada collects just over one-third of its 
tax revenues from casino gambling taxes, states such as South Dakota and West Virginia are also 
heavily dependant on gambling tax revenues, accounting for 17.7% and 12.1% of total tax 
revenues. Many of the states with the greatest reliance on gambling tax revenues are also the 
home of commercial casinos and riverboats, including Michigan (9.9%), Louisiana (10.9%), 
Mississippi (9.4%), and Indiana (8.6%). 
 
Table 1.1: Gambling's Contributions to State Finances 
State Gambling Revenue Total Revenue Percentage 
Delaware 208.9 2,918 7.2% 
Florida 1192.2 21,197 5.6% 
Illinois 1319.2 25,161 5.2% 
Indiana 895.3 10,446 8.6% 
Iowa 259.9 4,484 5.8% 
Louisiana 723 6,662 10.9% 
Michigan 884.4 8,895 9.9% 
Mississippi 327.7 3,494 9.4% 
Missouri 594.8 7,669 7.8% 
Nevada 781.9 2,139 36.6% 
New Hampshire 76.9 1,336 5.8% 
New Jersey 1243.5 23,223 5.4% 
New York 2172.4 40,328 5.4% 
Oregon 326.4 3,969 8.2% 
Rhode Island 262.2 2,735 9.6% 
South Dakota 157.6 891 17.7% 
West Virginia 380 3,139 12.1% 
Total United States 19,217.70 523,548               3.67 
Sources: Statistical Abstract of the US for 2004-05, State Regulatory Agencies 
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 It is not only commercial casino states that reap in gambling tax dollars, states such as 
Rhode Island (9.6%), Delaware (7.2%), and Oregon (8.2%) have been able to garner their fair 
share of tax dollars by expanding their lotteries through Video Lottery Machines (VLT) 
machines. Many of the remaining states with gambling revenues over 5% of their total tax base 
have found success with their original lotteries. This preliminary data indicates that states have 
many options to leverage their tax revenues on gambling and their specific game of choice may 
be influenced more by demographics and politics than by the profitability of any one form of 
gaming.  
The concern with states’ new reliance on gambling tax revenues is growing as more 
states consider expansion of the industry. The expansion throughout the U.S. is a threat to each 
state that currently relies on gambling tax revenues. With a limited flexibility of demand, the 
significant potential increase in supply will hurt states currently with gaming, putting them in 
danger of budget shortfalls. Gaming tax policies that were once meant to cover state budget 
deficits may in the future create them.  
Hurricane effects on States revenue source: 
 The summer of 2005 was a tumultuous one for the gulf coast, specifically Louisiana and 
Mississippi, where significant damage was sustained from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The 
casino industry was similarly damaged as the storms destroyed or flooded many of the casinos in 
the region. Mississippi’s casinos, which were required to be built on barges over water, were at 
the same risk as the Louisiana riverboats that were permanently fixed at dockside. The 
hurricanes shut down these casinos and cut off the significant tax revenues they generate for the 
state for many months following, with few casinos reopening by the end of the year (Stutz, 8-
2005).  
 7
  
Table 1.2 Hurricane Katrina Tax Revenue Effects 
    
Mississippi    
Fiscal 05 Fiscal 06 
July  $       27.5  July  $       27.0  
August  $       33.3  August  $       30.4  
September  $       24.8  September  $       16.1  
October  $       22.2  October  $       21.3  
November  $       29.0  November  $       15.4  
December  $       22.9  December  $       16.6  
January  $       29.9  January  $       24.3  
Totals  $     189.6    $     151.1  
    
 Lost Revenue  $          38.5   
Source: Mississippi Gaming Commission  
 
 While casino companies are insured for the damage and lost profits from closure, states 
will lose out on significant tax dollars while they are closed. Reports indicated that the state of 
Mississippi initially lost half a million dollars per day and a total of close to thirty-eight million 
dollars of potential gaming taxes due to casino closings. The damage led the Mississippi 
legislature to amend the regulations allowing companies to build land based casinos and resorts 
within 800 feet of the shoreline after the casino operators pushed for less-restrictive regulations 
(Stutz, 11-2005). Luckily for both Louisiana and Mississippi, the industry has been able to 
redevelop quickly and revenues have risen back to near pre-hurricane levels. The lesson to be 
learned from this however, is that once states rely on casino gambling, they begin to lose control 
of it.  
The Current Competition for Tax Dollars: 
The growth of states’ reliance on gambling tax dollars has led to heated competition 
between states for the existing demand of gambling. With tax dollars at stake, state governments 
are competing with their neighbors to capture gambling tax dollars from their own citizens and 
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citizens of neighboring states. This is particularly true in the Northeast, where lotteries began in 
the 1960’s and 70’s. Starting with New Hampshire, lotteries were introduced one by one, moving 
westward, as Massachusetts, New York, and Connecticut quickly followed suit (von Herrmann, 
2002).  
Ballooning budget deficits and declining growth rates for lotteries have led to states in the 
Northeast to pursue a variety of non-lottery forms of gaming, making them an optimal case study 
for this topic. In the last 10-15 years, Northeastern states implemented their gaming strategies 
while others faced political opposition. As political opposition has lessened and states find an 
increased need for new tax revenues to fund state budgets deficits, new developments in the 
supply of gaming are sending shock waves through the Northeast gaming market.  
Examples from the Northeast: 
One of the most recent developments comes from Pennsylvania, where a bill has been 
passed that will allow up to 61,000 slot machines to be spread throughout the state at racetracks, 
resorts, and slot parlors in major cities including Philadelphia and Pittsburgh (Beyer, 2004). The 
competitive effects on neighboring states are considerable. Maryland, a state with a historic 
horse racing industry, stands to lose significantly if it does not quickly act and allow slot 
machines within its state boundaries (Beyer, 2004). States with a high concentration of gambling 
that formerly enjoyed pseudo monopolies, such as New Jersey, Delaware, and West Virginia will 
witness an erosion of their market power and thus, tax revenues.  
New Jersey’s Atlantic City casinos also face threats from other neighboring states. The 
introduction of Indian casinos in the Catskill region of New York, a priority for the New York 
Governor, George Pataki, would directly compete with Atlantic City for New York metro casino 
patrons (Gambling Magazine, 2001). The three projected casinos in southern New York would 
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not only potentially seize Atlantic City customers but also pose a threat to Foxwoods and 
Mohegan Sun, the two most successful Indian casinos in the country from neighboring 
Connecticut. All along the East Coast, states are positioning themselves to gain their maximum 
gaming tax revenues.  
The Choices of Gambling Expansion: 
Commercial Casinos: 
State governments have shifted from lotteries to casino style gambling for expansion. The 
first of these forms of gambling is commercial casinos, made popular by Las Vegas and Atlantic 
City before the lotteries spread across the nation. Nevada, the birthplace of commercial casino 
gambling, for many years owned an unchallenged monopoly throughout the country 
(NGISC,1999). With low excise tax rates on casinos and few limitations, casinos have thrived 
and created a unique gambling market littered with non-gaming attractions and amenities. 
Regardless of casino gambling expansion of the last decade, Las Vegas remains the nation’s top 
casino market with solid growth rates.  
Atlantic City casinos in New Jersey followed the success of commercial casinos in Las 
Vegas. However, supply restrictions and competition from neighboring states have limited their 
success and growth. These types of casinos have been re-introduced by Mississippi and 
Michigan with similar restrictions to Atlantic City. Commercial casinos are typically targeted for 
urban areas, as evidenced in Michigan (Detroit), Mississippi (Tunica, Biloxi), and New Jersey 
(Atlantic City) (NGISC,1999). Commercial casinos are generally not an option for most state 
governments because many state constitutions forbid them. Casinos bear the greatest political 
and legal hurdles of all gaming choices throughout the industry.  
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Riverboat Casinos: 
Riverboat casinos served as the primary reintroduction of casino expansion in the United 
States in the early 1990’s. They were built all throughout the Midwest as an acceptable form of 
gambling because of the historical nostalgia associated with casino riverboats (McGowan, 2001). 
Riverboats, however, fundamentally differ from commercial casinos because their original 
amenities were limited and restrictions were placed on the dollar amount people gambled 
(NGISC, 1999).  
Riverboats were required to leave the dock and sail along the Mississippi river for 
gambling to take place. In many states there were limits set on the amount of money customers 
could lose in a given time frame and customers were not permitted to re-board consecutive 
riverboat cruises. As time has passed and legislators realized that restrictions stifled casino and 
thus tax revenues, many of the limitations on riverboats have been lifted. They no longer sail 
along the Mississippi river and most are permanently docked and linked with land based resorts 
(Thalheimer, 2003).  
Iowa was the first state to legalize riverboats in 1989, with many Midwestern states such 
as Illinois and Missouri quick to follow. States compete with one another by location and price, 
as some states have higher tax rates on casino revenues than others. Nowhere else is this true 
more than in Chicago, where both Indiana and Illinois have casinos positioned nearby. Tax rates 
also proved to be an important driver of revenues as casino operators shifted their marketing foci 
towards Indiana casinos when the state of Illinois raised their revenue tax rate up to 70% 
(Klatzkin, 2005).  
Indiana has positioned its remaining casinos along its southern border to directly compete 
with and draw customers from neighboring Kentucky. Each casino is targeted to compete with a 
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specific horse racing track, for which Kentucky is famous. The positioning of such casinos has 
led Kentucky gamblers to cross the border and its race tracks to lose revenue (NGISC, 1999). 
This has prompted many discussions and debates in the legislature about legalizing slot machines 
at each of the states racetracks (Atkinson, 2000). The goal of such an expansion would be to 
bring back Kentucky gamblers and their tax dollars.   
Indian Casinos: 
 With the passing of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) in 1988, state 
governments were helpless to prevent the expansion of Indian casinos. The Act did, however, 
give the states a loophole to profit from these casinos. The IGRA classifies gaming into three 
separate classes. While Indian casinos have complete sovereignty over Class I and II gaming, 
consisting of bingo and traditional Indian gaming for small prizes. Class III gaming, which 
includes slot machines, roulette, blackjack, and craps is the most lucrative of the classes. Class 
III gaming is only allowed at Indian casinos when it is allowed in other jurisdictions throughout 
the state (NGISC, 1999). This forces Indian tribes to negotiate gaming compacts with state 
governments that had restricted such forms of gambling, allowing states to take a piece of the 
pie. 
While Connecticut is home to the two most successful Indian casinos in the country, 
Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun, they are not the only state using Indian gaming to expand their tax 
revenue base. Governor Pataki of New York, is aggressively pursuing compacts with several 
Indian tribes to develop casinos from the Catskills to Buffalo. Rhode Island is another state that, 
in a heated competition with Massachusetts, is looking towards an Indian casino as a form of 
expansion (Gregg, 2004).  
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The use of Indian casinos, however, is not a strategy of expansion for many states with 
Indian tribes owning sovereign land. States that consider expanding casino-style gaming through 
slot machines or resort casinos must recognize the supply risks that Indian tribes pose. 
Legalizing such gaming options within the state would give the opportunity for Indian 
reservations to request and force a gaming compact for similar gaming options.  
VLTs and Slot Machines: 
 Casinos, whether commercial, riverboat or Indian, are not the only options for state 
governments. The horse racing industry has long stood as a respected form of entertainment and 
gambling characterized by traditional pageantry. Very few people, however, would consider 
opening new racetracks for the expansion of pari-mutual wagering on the horse races, but rather 
to capitalize on the growing trend of placing slot machines or VLTs (video lottery terminals) at 
them. As the horse racing industry has suffered negative growth rates, the expense incurred from 
other forms of expanded gambling throughout the country, states have introduced VLTs and slot 
machines at these fledgling sites to rejuvenate them (McGowan, 2001).  
Slot machines, the revenue drivers of casinos, have a significant effect on racetracks by 
drawing bigger crowds and increasing the amount of money wagered. The slot machines, which 
are operated independently of one another are significantly different than their sister machines, 
VLTs. Slot machines are by definition, Class III gaming machines that are independent (NGISC, 
1999). Video lottery terminals, which may look nearly identical to slot machines, are primarily 
unique because they operate in a connected system like a lottery and are thus regulated by the 
lottery commission of the given state.  
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The Importance of the VLT – Slot Machine Difference: 
The distinction between the two types of casinos style machines (VLTs and Slot 
machines) is noteworthy for both political and competitive reasons. States such as New York, 
with a longstanding lottery, are able to introduce VLT’s with minimal legislative hurdles 
compared to the obstacles faced when slot machines and casinos are considered. Slot machines, 
because of their independence are more attractive to consumers and are given more flexibility in 
their placement, thus making them more profitable.  
Slot machines are rare among states because of both the political hurdles and also the 
threat of competition from Indian casinos. Legalizing slot machines would force the state 
government to negotiate a gambling compact with any Indian reservations, thus further 
increasing the supply of gambling. Thus, slot machines have been pursued rarely, with the 
notable exception of Pennsylvania, a state with no Indian tribes wishing the build casinos.  
The combination of potential Indian casinos and the legalization of slot machines would 
introduce an explosion in the supply of gambling within a state. This is one particular reason for 
the recent legislative battle in Florida, a state with many Indian tribes, over slot machines at race 
tracks. Relative tax rates of 65% were added to the voter mandated gambling resolution, limiting 
the building expansion plans for slot machines in the state and creating a hurdle to actual 
development (Stutz, 3-2005). This was one of the political efforts of conservatives in the state 
legislature that recognized the potential expansion of gambling within the state from such a 
resolution. 
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The Future in Gaming Expansion for States: 
As gambling becomes more acceptable across the country and the supply of gambling 
increases, the logical economic result is decreasing gambling revenues in the current gaming 
states, due to cannibalization. Those states with large gaming investments have the most to lose 
from competition and expansion as evidenced by Atlantic City’s position. States combat their 
fear of losing gambling tax revenues by further solidifying their position in the gambling market 
with supplementary gambling expansion.  
Thus, current strategies, if undertaken by multiple states, may cause a self fulfilling 
prophecy in which states are destined to lose a portion of their tax revenues to their neighbors. 
While this may prove to be a more equitable distribution of gaming tax revenues among states, 
those states that heavily rely on gambling revenues will lose out as their potential for growth 
declines. The competitive nature of gambling expansion is not only necessary for understanding 
the motivations of state governments but also for quantifying the impact of their expansion 
choices.  
 
Literature Review: 
There is a substantial amount of existing literature examining the gambling industry. 
Books and economic papers vary from evaluating the different rationales for legalizing gambling 
to establishing the determinants of casino gambling demand. There is also currently work in the 
field that has addressed questions similar to the topic of this thesis where economists have 
examined the relationships between gambling industries (lottery, casino, pari-mutual). These 
papers have helped set the groundwork for which this thesis is based but none try to specifically 
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quantify state gambling tax revenues. While this thesis may draw from the knowledge of an 
abundance of sources, there are a certain few works that bear mentioning.  
Gambling’s Contribution to State Finances: 
The topic of this thesis and its exploration of gambling tax revenues and how state 
governments have used gambling as a tax policy were drawn originally from an article in 
Christiansen Capital Advisors, “Insight”. This gambling industry journal contained a front page 
article by Eugene Martin focusing on gambling’s role in state finances that judges whether or not 
states are addicted to or dependant on gambling. This article, while not from an economic study 
perspective, is very helpful in identifying what makes a state gambling tax policy successful. It 
lends valuable insight into how the gambling policy choices states make lead to protective 
strategies down the road that would have been unthinkable at inception.  
The article specifically examines the four states (Nevada, Louisiana, West Virginia, and 
South Dakota) with gambling revenues accounting for greater than ten percent of total state tax 
revenues. In evaluating each of the four states’ dependency on gaming and the risks associated 
with such a dependency, the article focuses on gambling privilege tax rates, and the capital 
investment in the industry.  
The tax rates and invested capital are not only related, but important to determining 
whether the reliance on gaming in a state is good. States with lower tax rates such as Nevada and 
New Jersey allow for increased capital investment in casino projects and significant economic 
development from non-gaming amenities and attractions. Large amounts of capital investment 
are crucial for a state’s gaming tax policy because such expenditures help give casinos 
competitive advantages against neighboring states. A tax policy that encourages capital 
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investment not only helps secure the tax revenue stream but also makes excessive social 
problems less likely.  
South Dakota, with high tax rates and little capital investment in the industry, epitomizes 
the addicted state with the legalization and promotion of storefront VLT machines, characterized 
in the NGISC Report to Congress as the “crack-cocaine of gambling.” West Virginia, a state that 
also uses VLT machines, restricts them to racetrack facilities, effectively creating “racinos1.” 
With slightly lower tax rates coupled with restriction to racetracks, West Virginia is able to 
encourage capital investment in their VLT’s. It is not able, however, to completely secure its 
revenue tax base as significant gambling expansion in neighboring Pennsylvania will increase 
competition. Now the state legislators are unsuccessfully trying to introduce table games at their 
racinos. These scenarios show how easily states turn to unintended and excessive expansion once 
they rely on gambling.  
Competition within the Industry, Casinos vs. Lotteries: 
 The relationships between the different forms of gambling are crucial to understanding 
the impact expansion will have on the existing gambling industry. Many economic studies have 
sought to determine whether gambling industries (casinos vs. lotteries) are complementary or 
partial substitutes. This determination is critical to measuring the effect of gambling expansion 
and quantifying the tax revenues a state can gain from gambling.  
 A study by gambling researchers Douglas M. Walker and John D. Jackson, titled “The 
Relationships among US Gambling Industries” seeks to understand the impacts gambling 
industries have on one another. Their work is noteworthy for not only its results but its approach. 
Their specification of variables employed to test the effects of cross-border competition 
successfully simplifies and captures a difficult variable. The econometric model in this thesis 
                                                 
1 Racinos are considered racetracks that have slot machines and/or VLTs.  
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will imitate this variable specification. In addition to their variable specification, Walker and 
Jackson included demographic variables such as poverty level and religion, using the number of 
Baptists because they are a well-organized interest group. Expectedly, increases the number of 
people in poverty decreased casino revenues but ironically, an increase in the number of Baptists 
increased casino gambling.  
 The most important results to consider from this study are the competition and intrastate 
relationships between gambling industries. The authors found that casinos and lotteries within 
the same state are partial substitutes and cannibalize each other. In studying the interstate 
competition, they found similar results of cannibalization and substitution with one notable 
exception: casinos in neighboring states did not substitute each other in a statistically significant 
respect.  
Explaining Recent State Casino Gaming Adoptions: 
While the end result of this paper may be quantifying the tax dollars earned from 
gambling expansion, it is exceptionally important to understand why states adopt casino style 
gambling in the first place. Edward Furlong (1998) used a logistic regression model to explain 
the likelihood of casino gambling adoptions by states. His paper presents a very good starting 
point because he investigates the real reasons behind the casino gaming adoptions of the 1990’s, 
including state economic condition and interstate tax competition.  
Furlong presents four rationales that a state has for legalizing casinos: revenue, political, 
competitive, and economic development. His results exposed many false notions about casino 
adoptions; mainly that indicators of fiscal stress were insignificant and that casino adopting 
states were in better financial health than non-adopters. While many political variables failed, 
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state ideological identifications had strong effects, as did job growth, with poor performing states 
more likely to adopt gaming. 
Furlong may not have been able to garner any significant variables to defend his revenue 
and political rationales for casino adoptions, but this does not discount their importance. One of 
the flaws inherent in his study, however, is that it was limited to riverboat casinos and did not 
include considerations for racinos and VLT machines run by the state lotteries. The other reason 
that Furlong was unable to capture these rationales is that they are extremely difficult to quantify 
in an econometric model. While many of the same problems may appear in this work, Furlong’s 
methods will be helpful in adjusting the econometric model.  
Casino Demand Determinants: 
 Among the body of research exists not only work that has sought to measure competition 
and legalization questions, but also the simple demand determinants of casino style gaming, 
namely slot machines. Given the goal of this study, to quantify gambling tax revenues by state, 
there must be a solid understanding of the determinants of gambling wagering in general. A 
study by Richard Thalheimer and Mukhtar Aliz has recently accomplished just that by focusing 
on the demand for slot machine wagering at riverboats and racinos.  
Thalheimer and Aliz’s paper, “The demand for casino gaming,” yields support for many 
assumed truths about the competition for gambling patrons. Their measures of accessibility 
found that demand increased as the customers in its market area increased and the demand 
decreased as access to competing casinos increased. The findings support the strong state border 
effects that lead to the expansion of gaming in order to prevent the exportation of spending, jobs, 
and tax revenues.  
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The authors recognize the exportation factor and also found that the regulatory 
constraints they placed on the casinos diminished demand. The riverboat cruising mandates and 
loss limits were to found to have a statistically negative impact on slot machine demand. It 
should come as no surprise then that even before “The demand for casino gaming” was written, 
states lifted and overturned many of the loss limit and cruising mandate regulations at riverboat 
casinos were lifted and overturned. The lesson again shows that what the state might have started 
with good attentions, was forgotten in the search for tax revenues.  
Measuring the Casino Cannibalization of State Lotteries:  
The competition between gambling industries within the U.S. is just as important as the 
competition between states for the gambling tax dollars. As casino gambling is expanded, such 
casinos will not only find competition from neighboring states but also from other gambling 
sources within the state. Thus, it is crucial to understand how different forms of gambling 
compete and specifically how the two major forms, i.e., casinos and lotteries cannibalize each 
other. 
Many studies have been conducted to find the cannibalization effect casinos have on 
lotteries; one of the more recent papers was one by Stephen Fink and Jonathan Rork, titled, “The 
Importance of Self-Selection in Casino Cannibalization of State Lotteries”. Their paper stands 
out and has differentiated itself from previous papers that attempted to measure the same effect 
by controlling for negative selection bias. Their analysis yielded somewhat expected results 
showing that the cannibalizing effect is 56%, which while significant is much less than previous 
studies have showed. Nonetheless, the body of research and this particular study have shown that 
casinos and lotteries are not complementary goods but partial substitutes.  
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Data: 
 The goal of this thesis is to predict the dollar amount of tax revenues state governments 
can obtain from legalizing various forms of gambling. For a complete analysis, I collected panel 
data across all fifty states in the U.S. for the years 2001 to 2004, providing a total of 200 
observations. This data consisted of dependant variables for gaming tax revenues and three sets 
of independent variables, gaming forms, competition, and demographic, that will aid in 
explaining the independent variable, gambling tax revenues.  
Indian Gaming Caveat: 
 While Indian Casinos have been described throughout this thesis as a gaming form 
through which states can gain tax revenues, data for this variable was not available. Data 
describing Indian casinos, their age, revenues and the classes of gaming offered would have 
strengthened this study. However, the data for Indian casinos is not readily available because 
Indian tribes are not required to report their operations and a complete almanac from Casino 
City, a source of gaming news and data, only consists of data beginning in 2003. This omission 
should not diminish the importance of the econometric models in this study, as Indian gaming is 
not a major source of gambling tax revenues for the vast majority of states. The competitive 
effects that Indian casinos have on state regulated casino-style gaming and lotteries will 
nevertheless be captured in the model.  
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Dependent variable: 
 The independent variable that the model seeks to explain is gambling tax revenue that 
state governments collect from lottery operations and excise taxes on casinos and other forms of 
gambling. The data used for this variable was collected from the major forms of gambling 
explained earlier that are the focus of this thesis. State government’s autonomy in reporting 
gaming statistics makes collecting a consistent set of data difficult.  
Thus, not only were state regulatory websites and the American Gaming Association’s 
State of the States report used, but Casino City’s North American Gaming Almanac was drawn 
from in order to fill gaps in the data set. The tax revenue data was collected separately for 
lotteries and casino-style gaming due to states’ reporting methods. The data was collected on an 
annual basis so that the sum of the lottery and gaming tax revenue would represent the total tax 
revenue gained by the state.  
Gaming form variables: 
 A set of variables that described the current legalized types of gaming in each state were 
first collected. The primary variable of this set is the year in which each current gaming form 
was first legalized by state. This primary variable provided the data for dummy variables 
describing whether a gaming form is legal or not in each year of the sample. It also enabled the 
creation of a time variable representing the age of each gaming form by state (shown on the next 
page in Table 3.1).  
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Table 3.1 – Age of Gaming Forms  
  
as of 2004                  
(time in years) Lottery VLTs 
Commercial 
Casinos 
Riverboat 
casinos 
Slots 
Machines  
ARIZONA 25 - - - - 
CALIFORNIA 20 - - - - 
COLORADO 22 - 14 - - 
CONNECTICUT 33 - - - - 
DELAWARE 31 10 - - - 
FLORIDA 17 - - - - 
GEORGIA 12 - - - - 
IDAHO 16 - - - - 
ILLINOIS 31 - - 14 - 
INDIANA 16 - - 10 - 
IOWA 20 - - 14 10 
KANSAS 17 - - - - 
KENTUCKY 16 - - - - 
LOUISIANA 13 - 6 12 8 
MAINE 31 - - - - 
MARYLAND 32 - - - - 
MASSACHUSETTS 33 - - - - 
MICHIGAN 32 - 6 - - 
MINNESOTA 15 - - - - 
MISSISSIPPI - - - 13 - 
MISSOURI 18 - - 11 - 
MONTANA 17 18 - - - 
NEBRASKA 11 - - - - 
NEVADA - - 74 - - 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 42 - - - - 
NEW JERSEY 36 - 27 - - 
NEW MEXICO 10 - - - 6 
NEW YORK 38 1 - - - 
NORTH DAKOTA 1 - - - - 
OHIO 31 - - - - 
OREGON 20 - - - - 
PENNSYLVANIA 33 - - - - 
RHODE ISLAND 30 13 - - - 
SOUTH CAROLINA 3 - - - - 
SOUTH DAKOTA 17 16 16 - - 
TENNESSEE 1 - - - - 
TEXAS 13 - - - - 
VERMONT 27 - - - - 
VIRGINIA 17 - - - - 
WASHINGTON 23 - - - - 
WEST VIRGINIA 19 11 - - - 
WISCONSIN 17 - - - - 
  
***Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming 
have not legalized these forms of gaming 
 23
  The other major variable that helps explain gambling tax revenues is the effective tax rate 
each state imposes on gaming revenues (shown in Table 3.2). The effective tax rate is very 
important for casino-style forms of gaming, but less so for lotteries due to minor variation. Data 
on the proceeds margin (tax revenues as a percentage of total lottery sales) is also not available 
for the sample. Data for this set of variables was collected from individual state gaming 
commission websites and Casino City’s North American Gaming Almanac. 
 
Table 3.2 - Effective Tax Rates by State 
  
as of 2004                Commercial 
Casinos 
Riverboat 
Casinos 
Slots 
Machines 
VLT 
Machines 
COLORADO 14% - - - 
DELAWARE - - - 35% 
ILLINOIS - 47% - - 
INDIANA - 32% - - 
IOWA - 24% 24% - 
LOUISIANA 22% 20% 29% - 
MICHIGAN 23% - - - 
MISSISSIPPI - 12% - - 
MISSOURI - 27% - - 
MONTANA - - - 15% 
NEVADA 8% - - - 
NEW JERSEY 10% - - - 
NEW MEXICO - - 25% - 
NEW YORK - - - 71% 
OREGON - - - 53% 
RHODE ISLAND - - - 60% 
SOUTH DAKOTA 15% - - 50% 
WEST VIRGINIA - - - 44% 
  
*** Effective tax rates vary by year but remain consistent for most states with the exception of Illinois, 
whose effective tax rate rose from 30% in 2001 to 47% in 2004 
  
 The data for this set of gaming form variables in each state provides a weak descriptive of 
the actual gaming market. The specific nature of gaming forms in each state varies significantly 
and is partially ignored due to data limitations and specification problems. Data including the 
number of casinos and slot machines would have better described the state gaming markets and 
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been helpful in predicting gaming tax revenues differences between states. These alternative 
variables were not included because the data was not accessible. While a cross-section of data for 
the number of casinos and slot machines are available for 2004, a panel set for 2001-2004 was 
cost prohibitive.  
Competition variables: 
The introduction of this paper paid significant attention to the competition between states 
for gambling tax dollars. Thus, accounting for competition from other states becomes vital to 
understanding the true potential a particular state has for gambling tax revenues. This particular 
set of variables not only captures the competition that states face from their neighbors, but also 
intrastate competition between different forms of gaming. While the data for intrastate gaming 
can be copied from the first set of variables, there are many methods to account for competition 
from other states.  
 In accounting for interstate gaming competition, there are two considerations: gaining the 
gaming revenue of out-of-state consumers and losing the gaming revenue of state residents. With 
the exception of Las Vegas, which has become a tourist destination, consumers will cross state 
borders for gaming opportunities by car. Thus interstate competition is reduced to neighboring 
states. Neighboring states are specified as being adjacent to one another (listed in Table 3.3). 
New Jersey and Connecticut, which are not adjacent states, require a minor adjustment 
presenting them as neighboring states because they compete fiercely for consumers in the New 
York Metro area.  
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Exhibit 3.3 - States and their Neighbors
State       Neighbor                                   State        Neighbor                                       
AL FL,GA,MS,TN NE WY,CO,SD,IA,MO,KS 
AR NM,CO,UT,CA,NV NV CA,UT,AR,ID,OR 
AK OK,LA,TN,NM,TX,MO NH VT,MA,ME 
CA OR,NV,AR NJ NY,PA,DE,CT,MD 
CO NM,AR,UT,OK,KS,NE,WY NM AR,CO,TX,OK,UT 
CT RI,MA,NY,NJ NY NJ,PA,CT,VT,MA 
DE MD,PA,NJ NC VA,SC,TN,GA 
FL AL,GA ND MT,SD,MN 
GA AL,FL,SC,NC,TN OH WV,PA,KY,MI,IN 
ID WA,OR,MT,WY,UT,NV OK TX,AK,KS,MO,NM,CO 
IL IN,WI,IA,MO,KY OR ID,CA,NV,WA 
IN MI,OH,IL,KY PA DE,NY,NJ,OH,WV,MD 
IA WI,IL,MO,MN,SD,NE RI MA,CT 
KS MO,OK,CO,NE SC GA,NC 
KY TN,OH,IN,IL,MO,WV,VA SD MN,IA,NE,ND,WY,MT 
LA TX,MS,AK TN KY,MO,AK,MS,AL,GA,SC,NC 
ME NH,MA TX OK,LA,AK,NM 
MD DE,WV,VA,PA,NJ UT ID,NV,WY,CO,NM,AR 
MA VT,ME,NH,NY,RI,CT VT NH,NY,MA 
MI WI,OH,IN VA WV,MD,NC,KY,TN 
MN WI,IA,ND,SD WA ID,OR 
MS TN,AL,AK,LA WV MD,OH,VA,KY,PA 
MO AK,TN,KY,IL,IA,NE,KS,OK WI MI,MN,IA,IL 
MT ND,SD,WY,ID WY CO,UT,ID,MT,NE,SD 
 
 Capturing these cross border effects can be accomplished by several methods, including 
aggregating the number of casinos and lotteries that neighbor a particular state. While data 
limitations prevent the usage of such a method, previous literature presents another, more simple 
methodology. Calculating the percentage of neighboring states that offer a particular form of 
gambling is a method that has been used in Walker and Jackson (2004), reviewed earlier. This 
method is suitable because it generally captures the threats each state faces.  
Demographic variables: 
 While legalization, different forms of gambling, and the competitive threats states face all 
factor in the determination of gambling tax dollars, demographic variables such as population are 
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key to understanding the potential revenues for each state. The fact that lotteries account for the 
majority of gambling consumption renders state population the primary demographic variable for 
this model. Previous literature on the determinants of casino gambling yielded a set of 
demographic variables that were also collected for this study comprising of the following: 
income, age of the population, educational attainment, unemployment, and tourism.  
The income variable, specified as per capita income, is not used to measure the gambling 
tendencies of low or high income people, but as a general measure of the wealth of a state. Thus, 
I expect that per capita income will lead to greater gambling revenues. The unemployment rate is 
used to capture the economic position of low income people who gamble to achieve higher 
incomes, and thus should yield positive correlations. To capture the age of the population, the 
percentage of people over the age of sixty-five is used to represent retired persons. The 
proportion of retired persons in a state is important because this community has the most leisure 
time of any age group and thus is more likely to gamble.  
Educational attainment is measured by two variables, the percentage of population over 
age twenty-five with bachelor degrees and the same percentage with high school diplomas. Two 
variables are used because education is the most difficult variable for which to predict the 
effects. It is more than likely that educated persons understand the negative pay-offs and 
expected value from gambling while research has also shown that casino players tend to have 
above average education. The tourism variable was measured by the number of employees in the 
Leisure and Hospitality industries and collected only for states with riverboat or commercial 
casinos from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data from states with slot machines and VLT 
venues were ignored because these forms of gaming do not attract the non-gaming amenities 
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associated with tourism. This variable helps measure the attractiveness and size of the casino 
markets in each state, a key determinant for revenues.  
Methodology:
 Projecting gambling tax revenues includes the proceeds states receive from running 
lotteries and taxes imposed on casino-style gaming forms. The tradition and age of lotteries has 
allowed them to keep an overwhelming share of the gambling market. In states such as New 
Jersey and Michigan that capture high values of casino tax revenues, lottery proceeds are still 
greater. Couple this fact with the higher incidence of lotteries than casino-style gaming and a 
lottery bias can be expected when measuring total tax revenues.  
Separation of Lotteries and Gaming:  
 Thus, to combat this potential bias and ensure the reliability of the results, two 
approaches were used to estimate total tax revenues. The first method involves using the total tax 
revenues gained by a state from both lotteries and casino-style gaming as the independent 
variable. The second method requires a two pronged approach with a model estimating strictly 
casino-style gaming tax revenues and a separate model estimating lottery proceeds. For this 
approach, VLT gaming, while run by the state lottery commissions, is considered a casino-style 
form of gaming because it more closely resembles slot machines that any other lottery game.  
Each method employs the same variables and similar specification, allowing a single 
discussion to accurately describe the process for all of the models. For methodology purposes 
and specification of variables, “gaming” will refer strictly to the casino-style forms of gambling 
that form the focus of this thesis and not to lotteries. Instances that require the summation of 
gaming and lotteries will be referred to as “gambling”.  
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The Model and Dummy variables: 
 A two way random effect model is preferred for our estimation, consistent with models 
used in the previous literature and the application of dummy variables. This model helps us avoid 
a major obstacle in estimating state gambling tax revenues for states with no lotteries or legalized 
gaming. While forty states run lotteries, only eighteen states have legalized casino-style gaming. 
In order to avoid projecting tax revenues for states that clearly should never receive any, dummy 
variables are repeatedly used throughout the models. This also enables us to isolate the effects 
certain variables have on the different forms of gaming. In each of the models, the constant is 
replaced with a dummy variable identifying the gambling form. Dummy variables accounted for 
lotteries, machine gaming, casino gaming, and all gaming (machine and casino gaming).  
While the ideal model would have employed a separate dummy variable to pick up 
differences between each specific form of gaming, consolidation was necessary. The low 
incidence of legalization for each particular form of gaming decreased the significance of the 
dummy variables and the terms with which they were interacted. Consolidation of the dummy 
variables listed above improved the sample size applicable without hurting explanatory power. 
The consolidation only eliminated the differences between riverboat and commercial casinos as 
well as slot machines and VLT machines; distinctions that are important to politicians but have a 
minimal effect on revenue. 
Variable Interaction: 
The use of dummy variables goes beyond simply replacing the constant in the model and 
noting whether or not a state has a particular form of gambling. The dummy variables are used as 
interaction terms against each of the competition and demographic variables. The interaction 
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terms are necessary to avoid predicting competitive and demographic effects for states without 
the particular form of gaming in question.  
The interaction allowed me to isolate competitive effects and examine how lotteries were 
affected separately by both neighboring lotteries and neighboring casino-style gaming. This 
method also enabled me to analyze the competitive effects for casinos and machine gaming 
separately. The dummy variable interaction was crucial for the intrastate competition variables 
that tested the cannibalization effects that lotteries, gaming forms and Indian casinos have on one 
another.  
The demographic variables used in this model are only useful when interacted with the 
applicable dummy variables because each independent demographic variable is not expected to 
have the same effect on each form of gaming. One pertinent example is education; while greater 
percentages of high school level education may diminish lottery tax revenues, previous studies 
have shown that casino-style gaming consumers have higher than average education levels. 
Thus, the demographic variables are tested separately through interaction with both lottery and 
gaming dummy variables.  
 Dummy variables are not the only variables that are interacted with a states demographic 
characteristics. A major concern for state legislators when considering the legalization of casino-
style gaming is the excise tax rate on revenues that should be applied. The demographic variables 
employed in this model are best suited to predict total sales dollars for each gambling form, not 
tax revenues.  
The estimation of lottery tax revenues remain unaffected by this since as explained 
above, there is little variation across states in the lottery tax proceeds as a percentage of total 
sales. However, the tax rates states impose on casino style gaming vary greatly, requiring a 
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reconciliation of their differences for the demographic variables. Thus, tax rates must be 
accounted for not through additive variables in the multiple regression model, but as interaction 
terms against the demographic variables.  
Need for Demographic Indexes: 
 The collection of demographic variables yields significant explanatory power for the 
model but produces an unintended problem. The high correlation between nearly all of the 
demographic variables creates substantial multi-collinearity in our model. This generates 
potential bias in the co-efficients of the demographic variables. Demographic indexes were 
created to combat this problem.  
Due to the varying significance and relationships between the independent demographic 
variables and tax revenues by gaming form, separate indexes were built for each dummy 
variable. Each index was specified based on the significance and co-efficient signs from previous 
simple regressions (Table 4.1). Rather than ignore the results found from models run with the 
independent demographic variables, new models with the demographic indexes were generated 
in order to compare results and ensure reliability.  
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A New Variable for Education: 
Preliminary regressions of the gaming-only model exhibited interesting results with the 
education variables. While the variable measuring high school education levels produced 
expected positive co-efficients, the bachelors degree education level variable yielded the 
opposite. Upon further analysis, these relationships make sense; people with limited (high 
school) education have increased interest in casino-style gaming over lottery type games, while 
those people with greater education understand the negative expected value of gambling.  
Thus, to capture the effects of both variables with the collinearity problems associated 
with including both in the model, an education gap variable was created. The education gap 
variable, mathematically defined, is the high school level education percentage divided by the 
bachelors degree level education percentage. The new variable was deemed successful in 
capturing both effects when it exhibited greater significance than either individual education 
variable.  
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Results: 
 The methodology used to predict total gambling tax revenue for each state yielded six 
different models. Three pairs of models were specified; in each pair, one employed demographic 
indexes  (secondary models) and the other (primary models) utilized individual demographic 
variables. The first pair of models forecasted total gambling tax revenue (overall gambling 
model), the second, lottery tax revenue (lottery model), and the third estimated casino-style 
gaming tax revenue (gaming model). The combination of the lottery and gaming models is 
equivalent to the overall gambling models.  
The Lottery Models: 
 The lottery model fits lottery tax revenues well but less so than either of the other models. 
Nearly all the variables included in the model (Table 5.1) were significant at the 1% level with 
one demographic variables only significant at the 5% level. The lottery dummy variable was not 
significant at any level in the primary model without the demographic index but was included 
nonetheless to account for the constant in the model. In the secondary model that employed a 
demographic index, the lottery dummy variable was both positive and significant at the 1% level. 
The age-squared variable representing the number of years a lottery has operated was highly 
significant in both the primary and secondary specifications of the model.  
 The set of competition variables accounted for both interstate and intrastate competition. 
The variable specifying the competition lotteries face from neighboring lotteries was expectedly 
negative and significant. Similarly, intrastate competition that lotteries face from Indian casinos 
and other casino-style gaming turned out negative and significant, as anticipated. The interstate 
competition that lotteries face from neighboring casino-style gaming was insignificant and thus 
omitted from the model.  
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 The demographic variables that were employed for this model all turned out statistically 
significant with an expected sign. The population variable was the most significant and the 
greatest driver of the model. Per capita income and the percentage of retired persons (aged sixty-
five and over) both yielded positive significant relationships. Also, as predicted, the model 
generated a negative relationships for the high school education level variable. The 
unemployment rate, which was assumed to be a considerable determinant in the model, was 
insignificant and left out of the model.  
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 The demographic index for the lottery, which was composed of all the individual 
demographic variables tested, was highly significant in the secondary model. As described 
above, not only did the index make the lottery dummy variable significant but it also raised the 
significance of the other remaining variables. While the index was able to reduce multi-
collinearity and increase the F statistic, it slightly lessened the R-squared statistic. Thus, it is 
inconclusive whether or not the demographic index increased or decreased the significance of the 
model, it seems to have had little effect on the fit and reaffirmed the co-efficients of the 
competition variables.  
The Gaming Models: 
The gaming model appears to fit gaming tax revenues better than either of the other 
models fits its dependant variable. The variables included in the primary model without the 
demographic index (Table 5.2) are all statistically significant at the 10% level and all but the 
competition for machine gaming are significant at the 1% level. The casino and machine gaming 
dummy variables are both positive, as expected, with a greater co-efficient for casino gaming 
initially indicating that casinos are more tax revenue lucrative than machine gaming. The time 
variables that represent the age of casinos and age of machine gaming were positive, as expected, 
with casinos yielding a greater impact once the gaming form has been established for seven or 
more years.  
 An analysis of the competition variables included in the model yields both expected and 
unexpected results. While the competition casinos receive from neighboring casino-style gaming 
is substantially negative and significant, machine gaming yields a positive co-efficient significant 
at the 10% level. The unexpected positive relationship between machine gaming and tax 
revenues may be attributed to the hypothesis that many states pursue the legalization of machine 
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gaming to recapture gambling tax revenues that residents spend in neighboring states. If such 
were the case, it would create a self-selection bias that explains the high co-efficient for casino 
competition and positive co-efficient for machine gaming. Other competition variables, including 
interstate competition from lotteries, were omitted due to lack of significance or sign errors. 
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The intrastate gaming competition variables both generated negative relationships that are 
consistent with cannibalization hypothesis between gambling industries. No distinction was 
made here between casino and machine gaming. After accounting for competition, the initial 
indication that casino gaming is more lucrative than machine gaming has been called into 
question. The competition casinos face from other states can be great enough to erode the tax 
revenue advantage exposed by the dummy variable.   
 With respect to the demographic variables, five out of the six variables tested in the 
model were employed and statistically significant at the 1% level. Per capita income, tourism 
employment, the unemployment rate all exhibited positive relationships as expected. The 
education gap variable affirmed the hypothesis stated earlier about the positive relationship for 
the high school educated level but negative relationship for college graduates. One peculiar 
negative relationship was for the percentage of elderly (aged sixty-five and over). This result is 
counterintuitive due to the expectation that leisure time would increase gaming visits. The single 
missing demographic variable from the model was population, but due to high correlation 
statistics and multi-collinearity, this omission did not seem to detract from the model. 
 The secondary specification of this gaming model using a demographic index did not 
vary much from the primary model. Despite changes in the magnitude of the co-efficients, many 
of which increased, the signs of the co-efficients remained the same. The two noteworthy 
differences were that the competition faced by machine gaming was no longer significant and 
there was a magnitude reversal between the intrastate gaming variables. In the primary model, 
competition from Indian casinos in the state was greater than competition from lotteries. The 
secondary model produced the opposite effect, with lottery competition winning out. The 
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demographic index did, however, lessen the overall fit of the model as evidenced by the R-
squared and F statistics.    
The Overall Gambling Models: 
 The overall model fits total tax revenues effectively, not as well as the gaming model but 
still better than the lottery model. With the exception of the dummy variables, all the variables in 
the primary and secondary models (Table 5.3) are significant at a 1% level. In the primary 
model, the lottery dummy variables is significant at a 5% level, while the machine gaming 
dummy variable is not significant at all and yields a negative co-efficient, which is definitely 
incorrect. This problem is solved, however, in the secondary model, where the machine gaming 
dummy variable is positive and significant at the 5% level, with the lottery dummy variable 
significant at the 1% level.  
 The age variables that help describe the time component of the model were somewhat 
consistent with the first set of models. The lottery age-squared and casino age-squared both 
turned out significant and with similar co-efficients compared to the separate lottery and gaming 
models. The machine gaming age variable, on the other hand, was omitted due to sign errors and 
insignificance. In the secondary model, the lottery age variable gained in co-efficient magnitude 
and significance while the co-efficient and significance of the casino age variables lessened.  
 The competition variables yielded similar results in the overall gambling models as they 
did in the separate lottery and gaming models. The most noteworthy of them was the competition 
machine-gaming faces from neighboring states with casino-style gaming, which generated the 
same positive significant correlation as in the gaming model. Similarly, the significance was lost 
and the variable was omitted from the secondary model with the demographic indexes.  
 38
  39
While the lottery and casino interstate competition variables remained negative and 
significant, only two out of the three intrastate competition variables were significant in the 
overall gambling model. The variable specifying the intrastate competition that a state with 
gaming faces from its own lottery was insignificant and omitted from the model. One of the 
concerns with this development is that by aggregating the tax revenues and variables from the 
lottery and gaming model, significance and explanatory power would weaken from an overlap 
bias.  
The demographic variables employed in this particular model survived significant multi-
collinearity that favored lottery interacted variables and not casino-style gaming ones. This is 
most likely due to the fact that lottery tax revenues hold a major percentage of total tax revenues, 
thus giving lottery demographics greater significance. All four lottery demographic variables 
from the lottery model were included in this overall gambling model with significance at the 1% 
level and the expected signs. The casino-style gaming demographic variables experienced 
different results as the population variable was significant when omitted from the gaming model 
and two of the variables of the gaming model, per capita income and the unemployment rate, 
were omitted due to low significance.  
The secondary model for overall gambling tax revenues used three demographic indexes, 
separate ones for the lottery, casinos and machine gaming. The levels of significance give a clear 
indication that the lottery demographic index, similar to the individual variables, dominated the 
model compared to the casino and machine gaming indexes. Besides confirming the lottery 
dominance in demographic variables, the secondary model verified the co-efficient signs and 
significance of the competition variables.  
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Result Consistency across all Models: 
 The purpose of using models with and without indexes as well as models to estimate 
casinos-style gaming and lotteries separately was to test consistency and verify results given high 
levels of potential bias. Verifying the results from the set of models will help in drawing 
conclusions from this study. Looking at the gaming form variables, the only dummy variable 
consistent is the casino gaming dummy variable. The lottery dummy variable is significant in all 
but the primary lottery model, in which it is most likely overshadowed by the more important 
demographic variables. The lottery and casino age-squared variables were both significant across 
all models, while the linear machine gaming age variable was only significant in one model.  
 Among the competition set, many of the variables were consistent. One of the minor 
exceptions was the counterintuitive interstate machine gaming competition variable that was 
positive in two models but insignificant each time the demographic index was introduced. The 
disappearance in significance for the lottery cannibalization of casinos in the overall model hurt 
the consistency found in the gaming model. The potential bias of aggregating the lottery and 
gaming competition variables may be the reason for such inconsistency.  
 The demographic variables should be considered in two separate sets, the lottery 
variables and the gaming variables. While the lottery variables are consistent across both models, 
with population being a major driver in each, the gaming demographic variables are inconsistent 
with the exception of education and the counterintuitive elderly age variable. The inconsistency 
is most likely due to the crowding out of gaming variable significance by the higher significance 
lottery variables.  
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The Fit and Limitations of the models: 
 The statistical measures of fit for all of the models indicated that they each had 
significant explanatory power and fit the data well. These statistics are partially inflated because 
the model was designed to predict zero revenues for the states that have no legalized gambling. 
To better test the fit of the models against the true tax revenues, a comparison was done on 2004 
data, chosen due to the inability to collect gambling tax revenue data for 2005. The comparison 
measured for how many states the predicted tax revenues fell within twenty-five percent of the 
true tax revenues of the state (Table 5.4).  
 
 This comparison table was necessary because the models predicted substantial negative 
gambling tax revenues (tax losses) for three states in 2004. The table is noteworthy however 
because it provides a better means of comparing the fit of each model. In particular, it indicates 
that the demographic indexes reduce the level of fit for the overall gambling model and the 
gaming model. While the lottery model shows a better fit with the demographic index, this is 
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expected because of the gain in significance of the lottery dummy variable in the secondary 
model. The comparison table also shows that the gaming model is the best predictor of tax 
revenues, as indicated by its owning the highest percentage of predictions within a twenty-five 
percent error margin.  
 A quick look at a table showing the percent differences in predicted and actual gambling 
tax revenues for each state in 2004 reduces confidence in the forecasting power of the best fit 
model (Table 5.5). The best model was determined to be the primary overall gambling model 
due to its highest percent accuracy. Nonetheless, nine out of the forty-two states with gambling 
have predicted tax revenues that are off by 100% or more. Omitted variable bias may be one 
reason for the errors, but the accuracy table indicates the lottery model and not the gaming 
model, for which there was difficulty obtaining key variables, is at fault. 
There are clear limitations to this model because lottery tax revenues may be particular to 
states for reasons that cannot be captured in a model. The lottery operating strategy employed by 
a state can have a major impact on the tax revenues garnered and is one such example of a 
variable or reason that cannot be modeled. An approach worth trying in the future to forecast 
lottery tax revenues would more likely be a fixed effects model or ARIMA modeling on a 
particular state with key demographic variables.  
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Conclusions: 
   This study set out to forecast the amount of gambling tax dollars that a state can obtain 
from legalization of casino-style gaming. The accuracy of the models makes it difficult to have 
great certainty of a dollar figure of tax revenues for states expanding gambling. Conclusions, 
however, can still be drawn about the relationships between gaming forms and what makes a 
gambling strategy successful.  
The gaming form age and intrastate competition variables confirmed the fact that 
established and mature gaming forms are significant contributors to gambling tax revenues. This 
supports the notion of a significant first-mover advantage in the gambling industry. As such, any 
introduction of a new form of gaming would only erode the current established gaming form and 
have difficulty gaining similar magnitude in tax revenues. In terms of interstate competition, the 
results show that states only compete with neighboring states on similar gaming forms. A state 
considering the introduction of casinos or machine gaming should not be threatened by 
neighboring lotteries, but only other like gaming forms.  
 Among the demographic variables, many come as no surprise, but the education gap 
variable gives considerable insight into the effect education has on gambling. The differentiation 
between high school level and collegiate level educational attainment and the differing 
relationships to gambling is significant. The lottery demographic variables displayed high 
significance and consistency across models, indicating their importance to lottery tax revenues. 
The differentiator between state lotteries that was not captured by this model was strategy and 
leadership, components that are vital but difficult to model.  
 This study may not provide legislators with a dollar figure for the expansion of casino-
style gaming, but it does give significant insight into the issues states must consider.   
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